China Spies

A spy trial collapses

The recent collapse of a high-profile China spy trial sparked significant controversy, raising questions about the government’s national security policies and the suitability of the country’s espionage laws. The case involved two British men — Christopher Cash, a former parliamentary researcher, and Christopher Berry, a teacher, charged in April 2024 under the Official Secrets Act. Accused of passing sensitive information to a suspected Chinese intelligence operative between 2021 and 2023, in September 2025, just weeks before court proceedings were due to begin, prosecutors dropped the case.

The collapse appears to hinge on a requirement within the Official Secrets Act 1911. This states that to convict someone for passing information useful to an “enemy,” the country receiving must have been considered an “enemy” at the time of the alleged offence. A recent High Court judgment in a Russian espionage prosecution involving six Bulgarians clarified that “enemy” status must be based on official UK government assessments (a senior civil servant’s witness statement) in place at the relevant time.

In the Cash and Berry case, despite months of effort, prosecutors claimed they were unable to obtain any witness statements or official documents confirming that the UK government designated China a national security threat between 2021 to 2023. While Conservative government policy documents from the period in the public domain described China as an “epoch-defining challenge,” that language was considered insufficient in law to meet the Act’s requirements. The Labour government has also avoided describing China as an “enemy” while maintaining a cautious diplomatic tone.

This legal shortcoming led to the trial’s collapse, with prosecutors blaming the absence of formal threat designations for undermining their case. Government ministers have denied any interference or suppression of evidence, insisting that legal constraints — the outdated language of the Official Secrets Act (1911) — are to blame. They argued that the inability to retroactively label China a threat meant there was no admissible evidence to support the charges.

The incident triggered a cross-party political backlash and from some security experts, who accuse the government of prioritising diplomatic and economic sensitivities with China over national security. As we shall see, the political backlash became so strong that Mr Starmer had to release the aforementioned threat level witness submissions, with some interesting contradictions emerging.

At one point, a senior civil servant, Matthew Collins, appeared to have been thrown under a bus, Dr Kelly-style, to protect other Whitehall grande dames. As the Westminster bubble dances on a pinhead over definitions and lines of responsibility, we shall concentrate on the entry-level counterespionage plodder’s obsession with who, what, when, where, and why.

Cash and Berry

Christopher Cash is a British parliamentary researcher and China expert. He is aged 30 and at the time of his arrest was a resident of East London’s Whitechapel. A parliamentary pass holder at the time of his arrest, he was born in Edinburgh, where he lived in a wealthy area and attended the city’s fee-paying £20,000 per annum George Watson’s College.

After graduating in History at the University of St Andrews, he spent two years teaching English Literature at an international school in Hangzhou, China, on a British Council scheme. He then completed a Master of Science degree course entitled China and Globalisation at King’s College London. In 2021, Cash began working in Westminster as a parliamentary researcher. A Mandarin speaker and parliamentary pass holder, known for his expertise on China, he became a prominent and skilled “master networker” figure in the “Westminster China scene”.

He worked for Conservative MPs, including former Security Minister Tom Tugendhat and Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Alicia Kearns, and as the director of the China Research Group, an policy group co-founded with then Security Minister Tom Tugendhat. Bi-monthly “Westminster China Policy drinks” were held at a pub near Parliament, which were popular among young civil servants, parliamentary aides, journalists, and think tank staff. He was also photographed at other diplomatic events, such as a party at the US Embassy. As such, Cash had access to senior figures and privileged access to influential figures and therefore a platform to shape discussions and policy and gauge sentiment among decision-makers.

Two years older than his co-accused, Christopher Berry is from Witney in Oxfordshire. A teacher, he taught economics and English in the Hangzhou region in eastern China near Shanghai, as well as holding various other teaching posts in the country since about 2015. A long-time friend of Cross, he ran a blog and YouTube channel in which he described his daily life in China. So why do we suspect they are involved in espionage? Because they were caught red-handed, that’s why.

A Security Service source

In response to criticism and inaccuracies in the government’s narrative, the security services have been briefing the media off the record. According to a source, information was circulating in Beijing which could only have come via espionage over here. Being of a specific nature, suspicion fell upon Cash and Berry. On returning from a trip to China in February 2023, Berry was arrested at a UK airport under terrorist legislation. This allowed his electronic devices to be seized and interrogated. On a burner phone, suspicious Chinese messaging apps were found which are not available to the Chinese public.

It was established that 34 files had been passed from Berry to a Chinese handler. It was also established that they contained sensitive information gleaned by Cash through his connection with parliament. The Chinese middleman passed these files onto a senior Chinese official in the Beijing Politburo, who this author understands to be Citizen Number Five — also known as Cai Qi. According to newspaper reports, Berry warned Beijing of a row within government regarding the Newport Wafer Fab semiconductor factory. This was sold to a Chinese company called Nexperia, a sale that was later blocked by Mr Johnson’s government in 2021 over national security fears.

Berry is also suspected of sending details of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee’s visit to Taiwan, which told of secret meetings with the Taipei administration and allowed committee members’ rooms to be bugged by mainland Chinese agents. Despite the evidence, both men deny any wrongdoing, while China dismisses the charges as ‘fabricated and nothing but malicious slander’.

Speaking closer to the time of the collapse of the trial, Sir John Sawers, a former head of MI6, said on Times Radio: “I don’t think it’s got anything to do with intelligence. I think these two people accused of spying in parliament were low-grade reporters of opinion in parliament. What they were doing, if the allegations are true, was certainly illegal. And frankly, I’m a bit confused and unsure about why the prosecution was dropped. Of course, China poses an intelligence threat, a subversion threat here in the UK, as well as being an economic partner.”

Sir John was right to be confused but perhaps understated the importance of Cash and Berry as ‘low-grade reporters of opinion’.

The witness statements

Amidst the furore, Starmer was forced to release the witness statements provided by civil servant Matthew Collins. In these, Collins quotes from retrieved group chat-like messages sent between the two traitors. These make clear that Berry was employed by the Chinese Secret Service and recruited Cash, who was receiving money in return for intelligence. The Chinese middleman between the two and Cai Qi was code-named ‘Alex’. At times, Alex would ask for specific information and expect an actionable reply that could be passed on to the Chinese Politburo within as little as 45 minutes.

Assuming nitpicking the Official Secrets Act of 1911 to be a distractive smoke screen, why close down the trial? Why indeed. Those with the higher moral ground might argue that improving our diplomatic and economic relations with the world’s second biggest economy takes priority over punishing the repetition of low-grade Westminster gossip. Those with the gutter instincts of the counter-espionage plodder with his who, what, where, when, why obsession might err towards a still hidden Chinese infiltration of parliament so large that full disclosure might topple the establishment.
 

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