Deeper in the Dirt

Two of my recent articles deal with the militarily useful information Iran might gain from their own pre-notified “swarm” attack on Israel and the recent retaliation by client Hezbollah for the killing of one of their top officials. In both cases the Machiavellian purposes of terroristic diplomacy with avoidance of all-out war might have been the only purpose. And the propagandistic value of keeping their own restless populations in line with the common enemy, World Jewry, as the sole reason for economic, political, and physical depredation. However, I postulated a significant secondary military benefit in both cases to Iran’s longer-term goal of eradicating Israel.

That secondary benefit, surely not ignored even by the theocratic zealots of Iran, is assessment of the effectiveness of swarm aerial attacks, the individual weapons systems used for those attacks, and the sophistication, depth, resilience, and persistence of Israel’s defences against such attacks. Iran is now searching farther afield for that “capabilities assessment”. This time, in Russia.

As detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal article, Iran is sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in the Ukraine war. Given Russia’s command economy, large industrial, commodity, and manpower reserves, and excellent scientific community, why would Russia need such additional armaments? True, they have been importing Howitzer shells and other conventional weapons from North Korea and have acquired and used many Shahed drones from Iran before this. Yet Putin is spinning up his military-industrial machine far more rapidly than Israel’s Western allies. The West is extinguishing needed domestic reserves of various weapons systems with years of production ramp-up ahead before they can match their own needs much less those of Ukraine.

If Iranian technology were that superior to Russian technology, then Putin’s military juggernaut may indeed be weaker than we suppose. Given Russia’s well-founded anxieties about NATO encroachment (see Jeffrey Sachs’ interview with Tucker Carlson on X) and the obvious need for large numbers of sophisticated conventional short-range ballistic missiles (which are also capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads) to deter that encroachment, insufficient numbers and sophistication of such weapons in their arsenal seems unlikely. Iranian and Russian cooperation in the sanctioned oil markets of the world and in ever-enlarging cooperation with China is well known. That cooperation may extend to expert mutual assessment of weapons system effectiveness.

As stated before, Iran needs to pierce Israel’s Iron Dome if they are to deliver a death blow to that state and assume a new Persian hegemony over the Middle East. When multiple generations of Ayatollahs state that the theocracy’s primary goal is eradication of Israel, I take them at their word. Their primary obstacle to delivering that death blow by overwhelming conventional weapons or by nuclear strike is the presumption that Israel possesses (by publicly admitted Western estimates) somewhere in the range of four to six nuclear weapons. Israeli delivery systems could be missile-based but, given their recent demonstrated ability to penetrate Iranian airspace and strike an isolated military target with fighter-bombers, may be by aircraft – stealthier, but slower than ballistic missiles. As I mentioned before in my first article, Iran may have already prepared all the components of nuclear devices save for the final enriched uranium. International estimates now suggest they are rapidly compiling uranium just short of fission-capable enrichment, perhaps enough for as much as four to six of their own “just-in-time” nuclear weapons. Certainly, one very sizeable nuclear warhead. How do these fantastical thoughts coalesce with providing ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine?

My prior two articles discussed the benefits of Iran’s pre-announced “swarm” attack and the potential “surprise” attack by Hezbollah. Valuable military information was gained as to Israel’s assisted and then isolated maximum conventional responses. But any hole in the Iron Dome developed by overwhelming numbers and directions of aerial weapons is more likely successful if it disables the “energy shield” over Israel – the electronic shield detecting incoming drones and missiles and enabling rapid exact targeting by Israel’s multiple layers of defence. That electronic “force field” has been developed and perfected by Israel with the cooperation and aid of Western powers, especially the United States. We have been providing our same methods and means of electronic warfare to Ukraine. From Iran’s point of view, the Russian-Ukrainian war may be the ultimate test bed for their intended destruction of Israel.

Curiously, the basis for modern electronic warfare was first developed by an immigrant actress of great fame in American film. Hedy Lamar, often called the most beautiful woman in Hollywood, had been married to an important Austro-German arms manufacturer. An excellent book, “The Only Woman in The Room”, details how her husband and important Nazi officials ignored her presence while they discussed in great detail the needs and deficiencies of various weapons systems. After all, she was just a woman. But her native intelligence and education, as well as her moral character silently outraged by the intentions she heard discussed, led her to remember many important details about these efforts. She eventually abandoned her abusive and dismissive husband and her country for the West. After years of effort, she gained true star status in American film during the height of WWII.

She became aware of problems with U.S. naval submarine torpedoes, which were wire-guided and notorious for malfunction and inaccuracy. Attempts to use radio control had failed due to successful jamming. Calling up her detailed memories of weapons design from her days as in invisible hausfrau, she worked with another autodidact, her piano player and musical director. Together they developed a radio-control method based on “frequency hopping”, fairly immune to electronic jamming. After many fruitless efforts (she was just a woman and just a film star, to boot!), she finally was able to largely donate the technology to the U.S. Navy, who apparently promptly shelved it. But later it was dusted off, and became the technologic basis for many weapons systems, and most famously, for our current cell-phone technology. Amongst both conventional and nuclear weapons, electronic warfare is the sine qua non of success. Our development of “surgical strike” weapons technology, designed to make any weapons’ strike maximally effective on military targets and minimally destructive of civilians, is completely dependent on this.

The result of our national moral decision to minimize collateral damage are very basic weapons systems (artillery, mortar, rockets, drones, etc.) that are very expensive and very slow to produce, as well as very susceptible to electronic countermeasures. Those countermeasures can be countered, but only after detailed knowledge of them is gained on the battlefield and much re-design of software and changes in production undertaken. None of that happens rapidly enough in an active wartime environment. The best way to gain such information is on someone else’s battlefield, one that is similar in scale and technology to the future intended battlefield.

That current battlefield, Ukraine, demonstrates all the risks and obstacles that Iran may need to overcome in electronic warfare. Porter Smith and Nathan Mintz, in their WSJ article “The Future of Warfare is Electronic”, detail the successes and failures of electronic warfare in Ukraine and in the Kursk incursion in Russia. They note the current “norm” of this electronic battlefield and its obvious weakness. “Using a $1 million missile to destroy a $10,000 jammer and clear the way for a $1,000 drone is absurd. With our current platforms, it will be the norm.” Neither Russia nor Iran have any qualms about casualties in their own forces or doctrinal restrictions on rates of enemy civilian deaths. The Ukrainian and Russian front-line soldiers have both demonstrated Lamarr-like inventiveness to counter current electronic warfare technology relatively cheaply and quickly against those mentioned very basic weapons systems. But more complex systems, such as ballistic missiles, will require more sophisticated protections and countermeasures against any defences. And so, the devil’s bargain between Russia and Iran.

With Iranian ballistic missiles Russia gains methods and means that another technologically capable nation has built aimed towards an enemy whose defenses Russia has not faced. This variance may provide Russia new insights in dealing with the non-identical but similar Western technology used by Ukrainian defences. Those Ukrainian defences may not be as effective, as yet, against Iranian missiles, meagre as their air defences currently are. Thereby is gained an enhancement of Russian effectiveness against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets without straining Russian missile production beyond its current capacities. The Iranians in turn get key military intelligence about Ukrainian countermeasures, which are almost purely U.S.-based, further lessening the vulnerability of their short-range ballistic missile arsenal. The key arsenal to any successful attack, conventional or more likely nuclear, against Israel. Especially if Iran can gain adequate intelligence as to the location of Israel’s nuclear weapons. But even so, their ballistic missile fleet, hidden amongst a swarm of other missiles and sacrificial drones, will arrive before any Israeli nuclear counterstrike via aircraft. And part of that devil’s bargain with Russia may be markedly enhanced technology to detect even stealth Israeli aircraft.

The Russians have been working successfully on their own stealth aircraft, and on detecting ours, for years. They have successfully used hypersonic missiles in Ukraine. Such technology transferred to Iran might be effective countermeasures against any Israeli incursion. And given the “necessity” of several rehearsal attacks on Israel by Iran and its progeny, Hezbollah and the Houthis, would Israel’s admittedly superb intelligence services (who failed on October 7) be able to detect which one of these swarm attacks contains nuclear devices before launch? And would the Israeli Air Force be able to penetrate Iranian air defences and find the nuclear, as opposed to non-nuclear, launch sites in a preemptive attack? Or would Israel, with knowledge fairly certain of such an impending attack, engage in a nuclear first strike? What would the foreseeable reactions and actions of the international community be to such an act? Would the timid West, or especially the currently “neutral” Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, etc.) militarily suppress the expected reaction by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Palestinians? How could the war dogs be put back in the kennel if the Israelis strike first? Who will strike Iran if Israel evaporates in clouds of nuclear dust? If mushrooms bloom in Haifa, and elsewhere?

Of course, none of these imagined fears may be real. The war in Ukraine cannot be said to be related to the simmering war between Iran and Israel. But Russia and Iran have now begun a very direct relationship. We must strive to evoke the intended fruits of that relationship before they ripen.
 

© Nik Bednarski, M.D. 2024