
The results of research in the field of “peaceful” atom.,
Julius71 – Licence CC BY-SA 2.0
In a previous post, “Will Mushrooms Bloom in Haifa?” I postulated that Iran’s recent swarm attack might not be a simple, if potentially deadly, diplomatic slap at Israel for killing one of their progeny’s leaders on home soil. As noted, the “attack” was in some way forewarned to the West, allowing the U.S., Israel, and several other countries to mobilize in preparation for thwarting the flood of missiles and drones successfully. I proposed a more Machiavellian intent of Iran:
Iran may be searching for access through the Iron Dome now. Their recent “retaliatory” mass missile and drone attack showed the relative impermeability of Israel’s Iron Dome when combined with the force of arms of several neighbouring and allied nations. Iran indirectly notified everyone that the attack was coming. Ostensibly to make a diplomatic “show” of retaliation for domestic and international Islamic consumption, while avoiding igniting immediate war or Israeli return. That is why the U.S. and other countries in the area were prepared to look for, find, and destroy many of the incoming conventional weapons before they reached Israel. Iran gained something other than diplomatic credibility amongst their friends and more direct attention from their adversaries. They saw the actual maximum possible effort not only of Israel but of the local international coalition in countering their attack. They gained direct experience in how well their current technology works against such a network.
They learned how large that network’s arsenal might be, and what it is composed of. This may have been a diplomatic tit-for-tat glove-slap; or it may have been a wide-ranging probe of Israel’s defensive capabilities providing information on overcoming those defenses. If so, the next such attack, again with massive numbers of airborne weapons, should be unannounced. That will allow a more realistic estimation of how to overcome it. But again, it will be broad-based, with no obvious specific targets to avoid telegraphing intentions. An additional scenario calls for several such attacks, with at least one in at least two waves, perhaps accompanied by simultaneous attacks from Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. This would illustrate how quickly the Israelis can “reload”, and how successfully larger Iranian missiles can hide in the swarm. True, the Iranians may exhaust their supplies of such missiles and drones before the Israelis spend all their defensive weaponry.
Hezbollah’s very sizeable attack at the beginning of last week may not have been a demonstration to their true believers of their capacity and “potential”. They may have been carrying out yet another type of probe to gain important military information for a more severe and generalized multi-sided attack. The ultimate attack might or might not bear a just-in-time nuclear device from Iran, hidden Waldo-like amongst the airborne cloud. What were some of the particular tactic benefits of this episode for Hezbollah and Iran, to be realized later with secondary assistance from the Houthis?
We are told that Hezbollah’s missile and drone swarm was to be released shortly after 5 am that day. However, as noted above in my last essay, Israel and the U.S. have very good intelligence, human, signals, and satellite-based, in southern Lebanon. Thus, the rapid preparations for launches were detected and Israel’s defences went on highest alert while their air force dispatched at least 100 aircraft to eliminate identified launch sites prior to and during the Hezbollah offensive. While the Israelis were predictably highly effective, Hezbollah was successful in sending many missiles towards soft targets. Once again, the Iron Dome(s) eradicated almost all of those not destroyed by the air force. Another stalemate with no gain, yes?
No. As noted, with the first massive direct Iranian attack valuable information of the depth, capacity, and persistence of Israel’s defences under the circumstances maximally favourable to that defence was obtained. What non-native resources were available to Israel, from where and how quickly were they mobilized, how well did they coordinate their actions, and how effective with what types of weapons were they against what types of Iranian weapons? Now, on this occasion, the attack was unannounced. Remember that Hezbollah has upwards of 150,000 rockets and missiles of various types, although not the most advanced and long-range in Iran’s arsenal. Their “swarm” could truly be locust-like. But they only spent a modicum of their capacity. Given their enmity with Israel, did they really intend a “demonstration” without possibility of real effect”?
What they gained with this attack was additional valuable intelligence. They now have a much better estimation of how much their organization and its communications have been penetrated by Western intelligence. They now know that whatever level of secrecy, coordination, and preparation for this broad-based attack was insufficient. They now know how rapidly Israel alone, perhaps with Western aid through satellite intelligence, can mobilize and concentrate their highest level “on call” forces to try to thwart such an attack. And how the Israelis will decide how much of that force to after-burn to the defence and from how many and what areas. Should Iran want to truly eviscerate Israel, with or without a nuclear device, a multi-staged attack from several directions in recurrent waves might well overwhelm Israel’s defences once concrete experiential knowledge has been gained about how those defences will be deployed. Even under the best circumstances, “no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Yet in modern warfare, attrition of military capacity can be a matter of hours, or days. Israel itself has shown that in 1967 and other times.
So now Iran and its client crews have discovered Israel’s maximal defensive capacity in concert with the U.S. and its reluctant supporters defending, by proxy, themselves against Iranian expansionism. This Axis of Jewish Eradicatism now also has insight into Israel’s individual battle plans and capacities for a “surprise” attack, and how much of a surprise can occur from an enemy on their back porch. Although I cannot have any concrete insight into how Iran and its proxies will conduct their attempts to grind Israel into dust, we must know that is their full real intention. As time ticks down towards a possible Carthaginian outcome, watch for and think about the meanings and gains of attacks yet to come. Strategy is not about ground gained or lives destroyed. They are looking for the weaknesses in the walls. They follow the oldest military adage — seek and ye shall find.
© Nik Bednarski, M.D. 2024