As we all know ‘the first casualty of war is the truth’. That short sentence sums it up neatly. Deception and propaganda are legitimate aspect of warfare. Both sides of a conflict try, in the modern jargon, to ‘control the narrative’ in many different ways and with multiple aims. That is normal. ‘They’ tell us one thing; ‘our side’ tells us a different story. Often this is justified: after all it is preferable to bombs and bullets – it costs much less in blood and treasure. But use of lies and obfuscation as the casus belli for an unnecessary war is not morally legitimate: it is an evil. Whatever the case, those of us who are far from the corridors of power will always be presented with conflicting information none of which, whatever the source, can be taken at face value.
I have followed the military course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict with interest, understanding that there are going to be far-reaching consequences for all of us. The military claims of both sides have for the most part been nothing out of the ordinary: exaggeration of the enemy’s losses; assurances that despite some setbacks all is going well; that sort of thing. Furthermore the strategy and tactics behind the battlefield actions of the combatants made sense, at least in hindsight. That was until the incursion into and occupation of part of the Russian Kursk Oblast by the Ukrainian armed forces.
There is something very odd and out of the ordinary going on in Kursk. As the reports began to come out, it was framed as a brilliant operation which had achieved total operational and tactical surprise: by implication a case for army training textbooks of the future. It was lauded as a strategic victory, a turning point in the war, and the Russians, it was claimed, had been proven incompetent for leaving the area undefended. It was not long however before it became apparent that it was undefended because there is nothing there of military value. And that is a great puzzle because whilst therefore the Ukraine had little to gain we soon knew that it had a great deal to lose.
The reasons for the Kursk operation are so murky that we are being presented with two widely divergent and mutually exclusive pictures by the same side, i.e. the Collective West. On the one hand Western media, politicians and military spokesmen still claim that the operation is a success; “master stroke” according to a British military spokesman just a few days ago; the Russian armed forces and Putin have been humiliated, the entire course of the ‘war’ has changed and so forth. On the other hand knowledgeable and credible independent analysts such as Douglas Macgregor and Scott Ritter state as fact and without qualification that it was a major strategic blunder, the Ukrainian forces and their equipment are trapped and are being systematically destroyed, and it is a futile and costly last gasp before peace talks and inevitable submission to all the key Russian demands. I suppose we might simply shrug this off, decide that the truth lies somewhere between the two and leave it at that until we see what transpires. I find that most unsatisfactory: ‘somewhere between debacle and total success’ is meaningless. I want to try my best to assess the purpose and outcome of the operation not least because there are alarming wider implications which carry the potential to directly affect everyone, and the mystery of Kursk somehow seems to open a window into what is really going on. When one meets a paradox, seek the third truth behind the two incompatibles. This essay is an attempt to do this using my experience of analysing complex problems working in science and commercial R&D. That means sticking to reliable information, staying objective and aiming to see the wood not just the trees.
We have to keep in mind that the success or failure of the Kursk incursion can be measured only against its aims, and these remain unknown. Even weeks into the operation there is little but speculation to draw on. Ironically this is against a background of freely available, detailed and quite reliable information of the actual military operations. It is available to anyone interested who has an internet connection. Independent analysts using satellite imagery and open-source data to confirm media reports and official accounts are mapping the terrain, disposition of forces and geo-referencing specific actions on a daily or more frequent basis. I have looked at a few of these and they seem to be generally in good agreement. For anyone interested I suggest two: Military Summary, and THETI Mapping. Both are accessible on YouTube.
So, why have Ukrainian forces invaded this part of Russia? The first thing to note is that it can be taken for granted that there were multiple aims: an operation of this nature and scope would not have been undertaken for a single purpose. That alone introduces a lot of ‘fuzziness’ into the question of success or failure. There is an excellent historical parallel that illustrates this very well: the British-Canadian raid on Dieppe in August 1942. Often described even with the hindsight of history as a costly fiasco, there are debates about whether the benefits outweighed the very great loss of life (the Canadians suffered 68% casualties), ships, equipment and Allied prestige. The main aim was to seize and hold the port for a few hours, carrying out demolitions, gathering intelligence, and other actions. It failed abysmally. It was also deep cover for a specialized commando unit to ‘pinch’ (seize) one of the latest German ‘Enigma’ coding machines. That too failed. All in all nothing positive could be pointed too at the time: ‘a bloody fiasco’ was hardly an overstatement. Yet the many lessons learned proved invaluable in the later stages of the War. Crucially any thought of seizing a port in the planned invasion of Europe was abandoned. The successful innovation of floating pre-fabricated jetties (Mulberry Harbours) that were employed on the D-day invasion was one consequence. Another was that the landings were made in Normandy rather than a using a short route across the English Channel. There were many other lessons that were put to good use in the ongoing war. So, was the Dieppe Raid a success after all? It depends . . .
Turning back to Kursk, perhaps we can begin to glimpse something of the complexity of what is really going on by starting from what we do know, or at least can be accepted with a great deal of confidence.
What do we know?
- The Kursk incursion was a joint NATO-Ukraine action, the USA being a (the?) major driving force. Neither the Russians nor any credible independent analyst doubts this. Official western denials are intended only for domestic audiences. Some nationals from NATO countries (Poland for certain) were directly involved – boots on the ground.
- It was a substantive military operation, comprising a large force (estimates range from 12,000 to as many as 20,000 men) including some of Ukraine’s elite units, well-trained by NATO, equipped with advanced armour and equipment (much of it supplied by NATO countries), and supported by the most up-to-date real-time satellite surveillance and well-integrated intelligence and communications.
- This powerful force was deployed against an essentially undefended soft target. The area seized has no apparent purely military significance. It is an area of small hamlets and villages with just one small town (c. 6000 inhabitants pre-war), fields, and extensive forests. There are no major urban centres or infrastructure, no strategic airfields, no supply routes of value within the wider conflict, and no critical terrain features such as high ground overlooking an important battlefield or military asset. The sole reported significant military target in the vicinity is the Kursk Nuclear power station.
[There are rumours that some top-secret Russian military nuclear installation exists but there has been no specific report of anything along those lines, and the absence of defences makes it unlikely. We thus have no option other than to exclude it from consideration.]
- The battlefield is geographically remote and disconnected from the ongoing hostilities elsewhere. It is also very different. Most of the battles in the Donetsk theatre are taking place in an urban and industrialized region with residential areas, mines, factories and other industrial facilities, transport and other infrastructure, and varied topography with high ground.
- Unsurprisingly given the capabilities of the invasion force and the initial absence of meaningful defences the Ukrainians were able to overrun a significant area of land in the first few days. Building on strategic and tactical surprise, deception, a well-developed plan, and accurate intelligence, they were able to advance rapidly aided by detailed real-time battlefield information provided by satellite and drone surveillance, mobile armour and artillery, long-range artillery, extensive use of drones, and sophisticated electronic warfare technology. It can be said that in this first full application of these fully-integrated tactics the operation demonstrated success.
- Assuming that the Kursk Power Station was an objective, the advance in that direction was halted by Russian forces and that aim was not achieved. The overall assault slowed, but the invasion force has not yet been defeated, is digging in, and is still able to undertake some offensive operations. The destruction of bridges to the west along with some cross-border raids implies that there was some plan to occupy further Russian territory in that direction along the international border or at least to protect the flank.
- The symbolic significance of the place and nature of the operation are enormous. There have been small-scale raids across the border by ambiguously-affiliated units and pro-Ukrainian Russian separatists (“plausible deniability”) but this is the first time since 1941 that western forces have openly invaded Russia. This is the very existential threat that is behind steadfast Russian determination to protect their western border at all costs, and which triggered their military action in Ukraine. Not only that. The symbolism of German tanks invading Mother Russia is mind-boggling. The parallels do not end there. It was a small-scale Blitzkrieg – ‘Lightning War’ – using NATO-supplied mobile armour and artillery support to advance rapidly over open terrain, bypassing and encircling defensive positions to be mopped up later by infantry assault units. It is being fought over the same ground, at about the same time of year, and with an overall offensive strategy similar to that of the German Army in the pivotal 1943 Battle of Kursk – a turning point of that war, exceeded in import only by Stalingrad. And, has had been the case at the initial outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR in 1941 it was a total strategic surprise that bore no relationship with what had gone before: Stalin is reported to have been in shock and denial for several days after the German Army crossed the frontier. By all accounts the Kremlin did not anticipate anything like this Kursk incursion either.
- The incursion took place within the context of a difficult and deteriorating military outlook for Ukraine in the main theatre of hostilities. There it is a war of attrition. This advantages the Russians. Early predictions by western sources that sanctions and Russian weapons capabilities could not match the supply of war materiel by NATO countries have not been the case. More critically in a war of attrition it is ultimately the willingness and ability to sustain casualties that determines the outcome: NATO cannot replenish Ukrainian combat forces without boots on the ground and embarking on a direct war with the Russian Federation. In the face of degradation of its military the ability of Ukraine to sustain hostilities is limited. At the same time Russia has been steadily and systematically occupying the oblasts which it annexed.
Assessing the aims
There has been much speculation but, as already stated, the aims of the Kursk incursion remain murky and paradoxical. Seizure or destruction of the Kursk Nuclear Power Station does look plausible and is consistent with the direction of the initial attack. But it was always difficult to believe that was the sole purpose, and incurring great losses by continuing the offensive despite failure to reach anywhere close I take as confirmation. Other suggestions and/or claims by the Ukrainians include seizure of land as a bargaining chip in negotiations; a morale booster for their armed forces and people; encouragement of wavering western backers; a gambit to draw Russian forces away from the main theatre; and humiliation of Putin weakening his grip on power. All of these and other such speculations looked very dubious, not only to me. The success of any one of them would of course have been very welcome but surely no competent military strategist or planner could have assessed a high probability of achieving such unrealistic outcomes? Admittedly the prestigious RAND Corporation has promoted all of them in recent published reports, but it is plausible to dismiss this as propaganda. I have puzzled about it since the Kursk incursion began. The fundamental enigma is why on earth did they commit such valuable personnel and equipment, sorely needed elsewhere, to what is looking to be a fool’s errand?
My view is that much of the difficulty arises from conflating the strategic aims of NATO/USA with those of the Ukraine leadership. It goes without saying that the operation was mutually agreed, but it does not follow that the strategic aims were aligned. The Kursk incursion makes little sense when interpreted as a military action intended to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in its ‘war’ with Russia, but a hard-nosed analysis incorporating the wider strategic and geopolitical context as seen by these two allies points to an at least plausible scenario.
I am now moving on from fact to interpretation.
The view from NATO
Sometime in the early months of the Special Military Operation a friend, a retired Canadian army officer, told me that “our” intention was to put a stop to the Russians by helping Ukraine destroy their weaponry, tanks in particular. The implication was that NATO’s superiority could do this, and also confidence that Russia did not have the manufacturing capacity to fully replace losses. I was a bit unsure knowing that wars always take unexpected twists and turns, but knew almost nothing about the conflict at the time. Over the following months the conflict evolved into a war of attrition and I became increasingly sceptical. Western faith in military technological superiority and manufacturing production capability has a poor track record in modern times. “Shock and awe” quickly overcame the Iraqi army, but when a conflict deteriorates into a long drawn out and bloody slugfest it is the staying power of the enemy and its willingness to sustain casualties which determined the outcome. As a Taliban commander so aptly put it “You have the watches, but we have the time”. He was proven to be correct. Vietnam was another case in point.
Then I heard about and read a 2019 RAND Corporation report, commissioned by US Federal authorities, which really opened my eyes. Entitled “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” it is the Rosetta Stone – an illuminating must-read for anyone interested in unravelling the Western stance towards the Russian Federation and “our” actions in the Ukraine. This is the geo-political context. A pdf of the document is available on-line. It is not a difficult read: its purpose and recommendations are crystal clear and disturbing.
First, this document makes clear by omission and the thrust of the arguments that Russia is not being considered as a direct military threat to Western Europe or North America. Just the opposite in fact: there is an assumption that it is militarily weak. Well, sure, Moscow does not have the overwhelming armed force necessary to begin moving west gobbling up Poland, Scandinavia, Latvia, and the rest. Nor does it wish too. The ensuing conflagration would kill millions, and likely go nuclear. But the report posits that militarily the Ukraine alone (with NATO backing) could prevail in an armed conflict. By inadvertently admitting this implication, the report proves that current warnings that if not stopped now an emboldened Moscow will begin gobbling up more countries and territory to the west are nothing but crude propaganda intended to obfuscate the real purpose of support for the Ukraine.
The report was written in the aftermath of the 2014 revolution and toppling of the pro-Russian Azarov Government in Kiev. It is an analysis of options that might be used by the USA to counter and reverse the consequential occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the outbreak of violence between the ethnic Russian population in the Donbas and the new central government.
It is based on what in the business world we call a SWOT Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) of all identified actionable options that are potentially available to stymie or degrade Russia’s ability to pursue its aims in the Ukraine. The report . . .
“ . . . examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political and military areas to stress – overextend and unbalance – Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad.”
The document reads almost as an exact blueprint for the current ongoing conflict: e.g. “impose deeper trade and financial sanctions”, “Create the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest”, “Undermining Russia’s image abroad”, “Reposturing bombers [now is long-range ballistic missiles] within easy striking range of key Russian strategic targets”, “Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft”, and so on. I will leave it to the reader to look up the report and confirm for his or herself its specifics, confining myself to those relating to the Ukraine – “Provide lethal aid to Ukraine” (hardly a “nonviolent” option).
First though, there is an important point that must be raised because it is so essential and crucial for understanding Kursk – there are two different possible overriding aims behind the declared strategy of containing Russia. The publically declared purpose is assisting the Ukraine in its efforts to recover and protect its territorial integrity. This is presented as a laudable and honourable defence of international law, democracy, and freedom. It can however be seen instead as cynically exploiting the Ukraine as a pawn in a belligerent stance towards Russia as an economic geo-political rival, not a military threat. This is the view of some western analysts, and presumably that of Moscow and most Russians. In the desire of Kiev to militarily confront Russia the aims of both parties are aligned. Less obvious though of crucial importance for understanding what is going on, is that in the latter case the USA and its allies ultimately see Ukraine as expendable. In the following by starting from the premise that this is essentially true, I argue that herein lays the explanation of the Kursk enigma.
It goes without saying that a military defeat of Russia would be a great success for NATO and the Ukraine, and any net positive outcome for any of the other options specified in the RAND Report would be welcomed. But in the final analysis the aims of NATO versus the Ukraine diverge and become incompatible. The inescapable logic – if not the conscious intent – of the strategy revealed in the RAND report implies that even complete destruction of the Ukraine as a viable state would still be a success provided that the USA v Russia cost: benefit is in the USA’s favour. Seen through that lens, overall US/NATO policy and actions both before and following Moscow’s Special Military Operation become readily comprehensible. It has little to do with the welfare of the people of the Ukraine.
Turning to the Kursk incursion specifically, we can now see that the probability of failure with severe harm to the remaining Ukrainian military capabilities must have been considered acceptable and worthwhile in such a cynical cost: benefit calculus. No doubt there was some hope that aims such as seizure of the Kursk Nuclear Facility might be achieved, and there is the certainty of some level of Russian casualties and destruction of equipment, but there must have been something else, something additional, of overriding value to NATO.
I believe it was an exercise in land war against Russia. It is no secret that since 2014 NATO has been training the Ukrainian armed forces and supplying them with armaments, equipment and supplies. The fighting in the Donbas has been an opportunity to evaluate the performance of NATO weapons and tactics and those of the adversary in the field. But those battles are being fought in a largely urban and industrial setting. Kursk is a very different terrain, suited to a war of manoeuvre and rapid advances by armoured units. I strongly believe it to be a proving ground in case of a NATO land war against Russia, much of which would be fought on this sort of battleground. This is the only scenario I can see in which Kursk makes sense.
The view from Kiev
If my assessment of the west’s ultimate purpose is essentially correct, and I have some confidence in it, then hundreds of thousands of young men, many old men, women, and children, and the viability of Ukraine as a state, are being sacrificed on behalf of the interests of NATO and especially the USA (European nations are experiencing economic harm too). So why is Zelensky behaving the way he is – particularly why the sacrifices in Kursk? Do they not understand this? The only explanation I can offer is that Zelensky and his military advisors are in denial. They believe that with the backing and aid of NATO nations, they can still prevail and at a minimum force the Russians to accept a negotiated settlement favourable to the Ukraine. Unlikely as that now appears, perhaps it is not absurd: Great Britain was in a similar position after Dunkirk. It matters greatly to the poor Ukrainian people but, as I have explained above for the rest of us it is NATO’s intentions and actions that are driving events.
Predictions
As I stated at the beginning I have tried as far as I am able to remain objective. I have based my analysis on established facts, published RAND Corporation documents, and the daily battlefield reports from open-source analysts. And the most plausible conclusion – the only conclusion that is compatible with Kursk – is that NATO urged on by the US Government (and, sadly, our own in Westminster) is so morally corrupt as to be willing to cause hell, misery and untold death and destruction wherever it suits its interests and believes it can get away with it. The poor bloody Ukrainians are being sacrificed in some deeply-cynical global geo-political game of chess ultimately aimed at toppling the opponent’s king in the person of Vladimir Putin and emasculating the Russian Federation.
What of the future? Here I am moving on from interpretation to plausible speculation. What is that saying – something like it is always foolish to make predictions especially about the future? Wars almost never go the way that is expected. I began this essay with “The first casualty of war is the truth”. I end it with “The second is the plan”.
For the USA and its allies little has gone as planned. The Ukraine armed forces are being defeated on the battlefield. Amid Ukrainian successes here and there, every day sees them losing more ground and strongpoints in the face of a steady, methodical, relentless Russian advance. Casualties cannot be fully replaced. The nation’s economy is suffering, and winter is approaching and whilst energy production and distribution are being attacked and destroyed. If I am correct about the underlying aim of Kursk, the implication of the harm it has done to the remaining military capability is that NATO has decided to abandon the Ukraine. Hostilities will drag on, uselessly costing thousands more lives until the realities force a negotiated settlement. Moscow’s aims have always been consistent and clear. First, the Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO. Second, following the 2014 revolution in Kiev – considered by many to have been a CIA-orchestrated coup – protecting the culture and human rights of the Russian-speaking majority in the east and south of the country. Moscow has made clear that there is no interest in occupying the western regions, and I can see no reason why they would other than in extremis. Given the military reality, I expect Russia will now retain the annexed territories and the Crimea, and the remainder of the country will be demilitarized. Depending on circumstances they might absorb or exert control over other Russophile regions and towns. We will have to see.
Geo-politically NATO, by invading Russia has crossed the Rubicon. There can be no turning back now. Throughout the Cold War decades Warsaw Pact and NATO armies faced each other across the Iron Curtain. Both sides accused the other of aggressive intent but we now know that both armies posture was defensive. Nasty proxy wars were fought around the globe whilst economic and political and diplomatic hostility was overt but the concept that either antagonist would actually invade the other in Europe – never mind Mother Russia herself – was rightly seen as mad. Now we have done this mad thing.
The result is that Russia has now turned its gaze to the east and BRICS. I do not expect it will turn back. I believe we are witnessing yet another major political failure of the USA and its allies as the global centre of gravity moves towards the east.
© Bluenose 2024
